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The Varieties of Aesthetic Disinterestedness
  Norman Kreitman 
Abstract
Disinterestedness, a comparatively recent concept in
aesthetics, is commonly held to be one of the characteristics of
an appropriate response to art, but can be understood in a
number of senses. Three varieties are distinguished: a strong
form which confines attention exclusively to the internal
relations of the work of art; a moderate variety which links
internal and external features of the work but solely within the
cognitive domain; and a weak form which permits the
appreciator to draw on a wide range of external referents but
proscribes purely idiosyncratic responses. An illustration is
given of the confusion which can arise from failure to respect
these differences. Only the weak form of disinterestedness
appears to be viable, and it is discussed in more detail.
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1. Introduction
Though somewhat fallen from favor in recent times, the notion
of disinterestedness has done heavy duty in philosophical
aesthetics over the past two centuries and has come to play a
major role both in descriptions of what happens when we
respond to a work of art and prescriptions of what we should
do if we are to behave properly. The first aim of this paper is
clarification of the concept rather than polemics, aiming to
distinguish and test for coherence and plausibility its three
main versions, each of which, or some approximation to them,
has been employed at least implicitly by various authors. An
example is then offered of the confusion which can arise from
failure to distinguish the various senses. The second aim is to
consider more closely one variety of disinterestedness and to
offer some suggestions about its role in aesthetic appreciation.
The historical development of the concept of disinterestedness
is illuminating.[1] The idea, which had long been part of
ethical theory, became established in aesthetics only in the
second half of the eighteenth century in association with the
emergence of the beaux arts. That grouping, which came to
replace the older and much broader notion of the liberal arts,
initially comprised only the visual arts and poetry, though
music was soon included. It separated the fine arts from all
pursuits which had any admixture of utilitarian purpose, thus
firmly removing the crafts and all hybrid activities such as
gardening which had both aesthetic and practical objectives
[2]. In essence the category was derived by a subtractive
process, which specified what art was not. A positive definition
of what unified the fine arts was much more difficult to
achieve and does not exist uncontroversially even today.
At the institutional level, the case for the autonomy of the fine
arts was rapidly accepted throughout Western Europe, in no
small measure because the main advocates of the movement
were powerful within government-backed izatorganizations.
The theoretical problems, on the other hand, continued to
exercise philosophers, who saw their central task as the
explication of beauty, from which the nature of art could be
derived. The subsequent change in philosophical
preoccupations towards the izatcharacterization of the
subjective response of an educated individual when
contemplating nature or artistic productions brought into focus
questions of how this contemplation was to be understood.
Some form of disinterestedness was held to be an essential
feature. But the concept of disinterestedness itself underwent
considerable development. [3] Initially it was taken to mean
no more than that an aesthetic judgment, like an ethical
judgment, should be independent of any material or social
gains or losses, or any other kind of advantage, for the person
making the judgment, nor, unlike moral judgments, should
possible benefits for the community be taken into
consideration. Subsequently the notion was narrowed to
exclude the observer's intellectual and any other concerns.;
The object was to be appreciated for its own sake and not
because it aroused the observer's emotions, sense of history
or any kind of curiosity. The critic, the art historian and the
philosopher were all reacting inappropriately if their
professional concerns intruded upon their initial aesthetic
response.
Thus the process of attenuation applied to various art-like
activities in order to derive a pure group of fine arts was
reflected in the cleansing, as it were, of the individual, who
when engaging with art was to abjure any considerations
touching on beliefs and desires or daily life. ( Schopenhauer,
for example, greatly admired Dutch interior paintings, but
stipulated that they should be of flowers rather than food,
complaining that realistic depiction of herrings and the like
made him feel hungry and thereby disrupted the purity of his
response.[4]) The only features of the artwork which remained
as the proper aspects for contemplation were said to be its
formal properties.
But before proceeding to discuss disinterestedness as
implicated in formalism, we might note another issue which
arose in parallel with the rise of the fine arts, namely the
question of their value or values. The beaux arts movements
endeavored to enshrine the autonomy of art. But given the
mid-eighteenth century preoccupation with moral refinement,
the education of gentlemen and the pursuit of practical
improvements, it is not surprising that the proposed
categorization, with its aura of other-worldliness, was seen in
some quarters as giving undue importance to frivolities.
Answers to the question of why the arts were to be valued
were varied. Writers such as Burney and Walpole modestly
justified their studies of music and painting as satisfying
curiosity and providing "amusement"; others of a more
earnest bent proposed that the fine arts were to be
distinguished and valorized by the noble and distinctive kind of
pleasure they afforded.[5]
2. Disinterestedness and Formalism
We might begin by considering disinterestedness in the context
of formalism. Our concern is not with the details of that theory
but only with the kind of disinterestedness which it utilizes, or
at least implies, as a component of the argument. The modern
form of formalism derives in various ways from Kant, but the
role he assigns to disinterestedness is complex and his
position is better discussed separately in a later section.
The twentieth-century version of formalism can be described
in contemporary terminology as positing exclusive attention to
the internal relations of the work, and correspondingly such
disinterestedness means a state of mind in which the observer
is appropriately immune to the work's external relations. It is
conveniently exemplified by Bell, who today has few followers
largely because of the circularity of his definitions of
'significant form' and 'aesthetic merit,' and because his
doubtful form-content distinction for the visual arts is even
less applicable to other art forms such as literature, even
though he claimed to be advancing a general theory of the
arts [6]. But leaving these points aside, what remains of
interest is the relation between strict formalism and the sense
of disinterestedness which it entails. Bell, it will be recalled,
insisted that only the internal relations of a work are of
aesthetic merit; everything else was irrelevant and could be
supplied equally well by other, non-art means. All the
spectator's emotions and beliefs were to be discounted, a
requirement for disinterestedness in its strongest possible
form.
Whether or not Bell intended his exclusions of external
relations to embrace cognitive along with other kinds of
knowledge is unclear, as he seems never to have considered
the point.[7] The historical question is not, however,
particularly important. What matters is that any such attempt
at disqualification is doomed to fail. The spectator standing
before, say, an abstract painting, will recognize the lines,
shapes and any colors for just what they are; that is to say,
will bring to bear his past experience and informal knowledge
of circles, lines and so on. We can even say that such
knowledge is constitutive of the perception itself, and that we
can never revert to epistemological infancy.
Apart from this rather obvious role of prior experience there is
also a consideration regarding the appreciator's future. A form
displayed in an abstract paintings is not an arbitrary figure
such as might accompany a geometrical proof where the
unique features of the illustration are precisely not what is at
issue. If the work is of any interest, it will offer the viewer
spatial dispositions which to some degree surprise him with
the realization that the relationship of such elements is not as
he has always supposed they must be; for example, that it is
possible for a circle intersected by several lines to come to
simulate a series of triangles.[8] It thus becomes part of the
viewer's experience that there is at least one member of the
class of, for example, circles, that has unfamiliar and
noteworthy features. The viewer has learned something;
previous assumptions have been modified, and at least for a
while fresh insight will be carried into subsequent encounters.
Thus, interaction with the work depends on the viewer's past
and amends the future, in contrast with the state of hermetic
isolation indicated by strong disinterestedness. Further, what
has been argued for the visual arts appears in principle equally
applicable to the other artforms.
In summary, the strong sense of disinterestedness which may
be attached to a narrow view of internal relations, such as
comprehensively to exclude both prior and subsequent
experience, is untenable.
3. Moderate Disinterestedness
There is a second, less restrictive meaning of disinterestedness
which can be termed the moderate form. It makes its
appearance in Kantian theory, which will be discussed in
Section 4, below. This version, too, arises primarily in relation
to the visual arts, though by no means exclusively. It differs
from the first sense in that while it focuses attention on the
purely formal elements of an artwork, it accepts that even a
non-representational work cannot be described as having no
reference at all to categories with which we are familiar from
everyday life. But it iclaims that we can reasonably assume, if
never prove, that formal properties are similarly perceived by
everyone with normal senses under standard conditions and
that since this cognitive-perceptual experience is universally
the same, it has no necessary connection with anything that is
unique to individual observers who will vary widely one from
another. In particular, it needs have no linkage with other
components of experience, such as the emotions. What the
work displays are spatial and similar relations, such as
temporal structures, as in narrative, and these merit our
undivided attention. Through our encounter with the work, we
may modify our general knowledge of such relations but of
nothing more, and we err if we obscure our perception by
cloudy and irrelevant subjectivity. The work itself has no
bearing on our wider concerns, and in this sense our
perception is, and should be, disinterested.
Such a thesis skims over a number of debatable assumptions
concerning what the work in question is really about. It also
reflects an old-fashioned view of a cognitive faculty operating
in a restricted and isolated range of mental functions. But it is
particularly suspect on two main counts. First, can we
confidently assert that pure forms have no affective
concomitants, and that a perfect circle, for example, carries no
overtones? Many mystics, especially those in the eastern
tradition, have thought otherwise, while for those who hold no
such beliefs, alternative interpretations, such as Freudian
ones, could be proposed. The association of forms with
emotions may be culturally determined, but it remains the
case that all human beings are acculturated. The same holds
for associations to colors, which are even more likely than
simple shapes to be linked with affect, as evidenced by the
long tradition in European art theory concerning the emotional
qualities of the different hues.[9]
The second difficulty is that spatial relations have a major role
in the images and metaphors we use to structure practically all
our experiences.[10] We speak of a "high" moral tone, the
"depths" of despair, of getting "through" an examination and
so on. Spatial orientation, far from being hermetically sealed
off from the rest of our mental life, appears to lie at the core
of our thinking about nearlyeverything. How far the
modification to our standard space-time orientation as
proposed by any particular artwork does in fact fertilize other
areas of experience, perhaps including the core sense of the
self, remains an open question. However, it certainly appears
that modernist art, with its emphasis on fractionation and
multiple, simultaneous perspectives has informed twentieth-
century sensibility across the whole cultural spectrum. That
such a change has influenced much that we term personal
experience is a possibility that cannot be ruled out. This being
so, the notion of spatial cognition as compartmentalized must
raise considerable doubt. It follows that moderate
disinterestedness, since it is predicated on the same concept
of an autonomous function, must be similarly viewed with
suspicion. The formal qualities of a work are of cardinal
importance, but our engagement with art involves much wider
interests than the moderate thesis proposes.
4. Disinterestedness as Exclusion of Personal
Associations
A third possible meaning of disinterestedness, and the one
which is most widely used, is also the weakest, in that allows
that in responding to art it is appropriate to react both
cognitively and emotionally to almost any referents it may
have to the larger world. The only constraint is that reaction
to the work as an aesthetic object should not depend on
anything which distinguishes the unique disposition, life history
or other individual features of one appreciator from another.
All appreciators will have much in common, which can be
called, however vaguely, "human nature," but idiosyncratic
associations, such as that we have visited the scene depicted
in a landscape picture or that a piece of music induces
nostalgia, are to be set aside.
This formulation requires some clarification. It is not implied
that the exclusion of the purely personal will always enhance
the total impact of an artwork. Sometimes it is evident that
private associations and specialized knowledge are simply
irrelevant to the aesthetic response. A soldier will recognize
that a battle scene in an opera is a poor representation of
reality, but s/he may accept that such a stereotypic rendering
is perfectly appropriate within its context. In such examples,
disinterest as the exclusion of personal associations -- is
advantagous. But, to take a well-worn example from Bullough,
suppose a person prone to jealousy watches a performance of
Othello.[11] It is unlikely that such a person would even try to
adopt the role of the average person and set aside his or her
own history. Bullough described the probable reaction by the
jealousy-prone person as "under-distanced" and a distortion of
the attitude appropriate for aesthetic response. But on the
contrary, if the person were to discount his or her experience,
then the dramatic situation would be less powerful and
rewarding and his or her appreciation of Shakespeare's
insights reduced. Disinterestedness does not, then, describe
what invariably happens, nor can it be advocated as always
enhancing the intensity of aesthetic responsiveness. On the
other hand and as suggested above, a lack of
disinterestedness would almost certainly distort critical
assessment of any one work in comparison to another which
carried different personal associations. The important
distinction between intensity of response to a work (horror
films and tearjerkers are cases in point ) and judgment about
its aesthetic merit is often overlooked, but needs to be
respected.
However, the idea of even weak disinterestedness has raised
considerable opposition, directed either at the concept itself or
its closely allied notions of the aesthetic attitude, aesthetic
contemplation and the like.[12] The nub of these criticisms is
that the concept is redundant. Appreciation of art, it is said,
requires complete and undisturbed attention, as do many
other activities, from fly-fishing to doing nuclear physics.
Anything which disrupts attention from the work itself must
weaken the aesthetic response. Such impairments can be
caused by a whole range of distractions: having indigestion,
being preoccupied with tax affairs,or even particular situations
such as that one's daughter is acting in the play one is
watching. But there is no case for singling out personal
concerns as any different from other kinds of irrelevancies.
Similarly, there is no need to postulate any special kind of
attitude, attention or contemplation as unique to the aesthetic
response. Perception is perception and attention is attention;
these may be full or partial, but there are no special kinds of
perception or attention. Similarly, one could say that full
attention already means disinterestedness and there is no
point in bringing in further conceptual baggage.
All this may be accepted, but the defender of the role of weak
disinterestedness can claim that it misses the point. What is
important is not the nature of attention or perception as such,
but what the appreciator makes of that which is attended to.
That is to say, the importance lies in how s/he interacts with
the work and interprets what is perceived; of how, in short,
the work is to be recognized as carrying a meaning which is
not constrained by the appreciator's biography. Objections
have also been raised on the grounds that disinterestedness
implies an unwelcome restraint on the range and intensity of
the appreciator's response to an artwork, a degree of
emotional aloofness, but these strictures could only apply to
the strong and moderate forms, not the weak variety. These
points will be elaborated later; for the moment it seems that
weak disinterestedness can be defended against its main
critics.
5. Disinterestedness and Kant's Critique of Judgment
There are, then, grounds for considering that only the weak
form of disinterestedness is viable. Nevertheless, others may
disagree and continue to use the concept in its strong or
moderate sense or, worse, fail to distinguish between any of
its various meanings. A contention of this essay is that such
vagueness leads to serious confusion. An example of that sorry
state is conveniently provided by Kant, whose continuing
influence, in any case, demands attention.
Kant's concern in his Critique of Judgment is to elucidate the
"judgment of taste," his term for what is involved when we call
something beautiful. He is motivated from the outset with
establishing normative claims for such judgments, and argues
that with respect to the perception of beauty there are
grounds not for soliciting but for demanding agreement from
others. If everyone is to concur, then their judgments must
relate to what is universally perceived, undistorted by
individual differences, and this condition can only be achieved
by pure contemplation of a limited range of properties of the
object, namely its formal qualities.
Kant describes two varieties of beauty. Free beauty is found
when delight arises solely from disinterested, reflective
contemplation. Mere sensory pleasures of sight or sound have
no essential part, for by themselves they belong to only to the
agreeable or charming. Likewise, no determinate concept (one
capable of being clearly formulated) concerning the object is
to be admitted. Even the knowledge of whether the
representation relates to a real object is to be put aside, since
a real object would stand in some relationship to the observer
and hence evoke an attitude. All that is to be considered is the
form. Simple stimuli, such as a single musical note or a color,
raise certain problems, but in complex examples the formal
qualities which make for beauty are those which have the
appearance of a design (or "finality"). The representation must
have the appearance of being organized with respect to some
purpose or end, though that end-point remains unspecified
and unspecifiable. It is implied, if not explicitly stated, that the
most perfect examples are to be found in Nature.
A key feature of this account is disinterestedness, and we may
ask exactly how this, or its opposite, interest, is to be
understood.. Interest is said to be indexed by satisfaction with
the real existence of the aesthetic object (or its
"representation") as contrasted with delight arising solely from
consideration of its "formal purposiveness." An immediate
problem is that we do, of course, take considerable interest in
fictions of many kinds, so interest can also apply to unreal
objects. An alternative interpretation of the text is possible,
however, according to which interest is to be understood as
little more than paying attention[13] Whatever the details, the
point is that for Kant interest implies some kind of desire,
want or prior attitude on the part of the observer, and these
Kant seeks to eliminate from judgments of taste.
To make his case for claiming that judgments about free
beauty are in fact disinterested in the sense just outlined, Kant
draws on two arguments. One is to assert that the kind of
detached contemplation he describes is what, in fact, occurs in
practice. This is perilously close to begging the question. The
second, developed at greater length, is cast in negative form.
All interests, it is claimed, are located within a small group of
concerns comprising the sensual, the moral, or assessment of
the goodness of an object either instrumentally or as perfect
of its kind. When these interests are satisfied, some variety of
pleasure may result, but those pleasures differ in various ways
from aesthetic delight. The latter cannot therefore be based
upon interest. This elimination argument, as it is often called,
is very weak, since the list of interests has not been shown to
be exhaustive; there could be many other kinds which have
not been considered.[14]
He then offers a more positive characterization of experience
of the beautiful. "Practical" pleasures entail some movement
towards the intentional object; thus the pleasure of eating
requires obtaining good food. Contemplative pleasure, on the
other hand, is a passive delight, with no desire to act, and
indeed with complete indifference as to the reality of the
object as already noted. Interest is totally lacking. But this line
of reasoning runs into the problem that we do, in fact, desire
experience of the beautiful, both before and after the aesthetic
encounter. To meet this, Kant introduces the strained notion of
"inner causality," which at least one commentator has
described as "clouded" if not incoherent.[15] It is simpler and
much more convincing to say that the judgment of taste does
involve an interest, albeit one which is very limited.
With dependent beauty, which includes all art, the defining
property of which is its embodiment of the beautiful, and
everything which can be understood as fulfilling some
definable purpose, the position is different. While consideration
of form remains very important, interest in a broader sense is
not only permitted but is unavoidable, since the observer must
now entertain some idea concerning the object. The specificity
of the concepts to be admitted is not made clear, but
presumably may range from the minimal -"this is a painting" -
to the highly complex - "this a depiction of the Battle of
Coruna." Yet whatever degree of precision is allowed, Kant's
position on dependent beauty becomes self-contradictory. As
just noted, a judgment of beauty must be concept-free, but
dependent beauty necessitates concepts. Similarly, the proper
appreciation of formal qualities requires virtually complete
disinterestedness, but no such detachment is possible once
concepts are involved. In the senses used in our earlier
discussion, there is a conflict between the moderate and the
weak meanings of disinterestedness.[16]
This confusion has often been discussed and a number of
solutions proposed,[17] but our concern here is limited to
noting that the kind of disinterestedness posited by free
beauty is in opposition to that of dependent beauty. It is
tempting to suggest that if the different kinds of
disinterestedness had been more clearly recognized in
advance, the free-dependent distinction would never have
been put forward. On the other hand, if these varieties are
appreciated, then Kantians can claim that acceptance of the
dual meanings of the term can go some way to save the
argument and that both kinds of disinterestedness can be
operative in contemplating an artwork. For example, in her
discussion of the female nude in painting, Brand proposes that
one form of contemplation is "interested" and includes regard
for the sexual attractiveness of the figure, while the other
approximates to, though never quite reaches, a disinterested
or dispassionate concern with the formal properties of the
painting itself.[18] Some such proposals, though they pose
considerable difficulties, are evidently required if confusion is
to be avoided.
6. Cultural Disinterestedness and Aesthetic Appreciation
We have seen that of the various forms of disinterestedness
the weak variety is the only one which appears to withstand
adverse scrutiny. In a more positive vein, some considerations
can be advanced which add support to the concept. One is
what might be termed "cultural disinterestedness." The
impersonal stance we have considered is one in which we seek
to approximate the outlook of what social psychologists have
termed the "generalized other," that is to say, the typical
member of our group. Yet that group has elastic boundaries,
capable of extensive enlargement. Standing before a
mediaeval religious painting, we recognize inter alia that it is
replete with symbolism which we understand only imperfectly
and which has lost its original emotional impact and that it
was intended for use in a social context that has vanished.
Indeed, we are being offered a glimpse of another world. This
is similar to literary productions from earlier times. In
response to such works, we adopt what we take to be an
appropriate frame of reference. The complexity of this task
should not be underestimated. Even the most erudite
Shakespearean scholar has to struggle to achieve the mind-
set of the Elizabethans, while with classical Greek drama we
cannot be certain even of the meanings of many words
typically used in those plays.
However, it is surely remarkable that we often do attempt to
give up all the dense associations of our personal lives and of
our immediate culture in the service of our role as
appreciators. If the work and our familiar world do not fit, we
try to consider ourselves members of a different society, which
is to say that the appreciator tries to imagine him- or herself
as a different kind of person. Artifacts of exotic origin are, of
course, less commonly encountered than those of our own
culture, but our responses to them illustrates how we expand
our frames of reference when reacting to any interesting work
by a temporary divorce from our standard point of view. Such
plasticity is only possible if we are willing, at least in certain
relevant respects, to abandon the everyday self, and it is just
the capacity to do this which is weak disinterestedness.
There is an analogy here with empathic understanding of
another person, when we to attempt to grasp how and why
that person feels as they do. Empathic outreach commonly
occurs within a dynamic interaction, so that the we continually
correct our inferences about the other, but a degree of
disinterestedness is required at every stage. For the emotions
other persons express and the projects they entertain will not
necessarily be those we would have were we in the same
situation, since no two people can have precisely the same
world-view. Of course there are limits to our empathic abilities,
which we reach when our most basic assumptions conflict with
those of the other, but we can and do try to assume the
other's viewpoint as far as we can. And as with cultural
disinterestedness, we can make some progress. We may then
be rewarded not only by the strengthening of a social bond but
also by learning that there are perspectives on the world
different from our own and which may have something to
offer. Again, flexible detachment is of the essence. [19]
For clarity, it may be added that something very similar also
seems to be required for other kinds of endeavor, such as
scientific research. The question of whether disinterestedness
functions in quite the same way in these different contexts can
be left open, but that it is feature of several activities does not
reduce its importance for aesthetic appreciation.
Secondly, there is a relevant aspect of the phenomenology of
involvement with art, namely the sense of liberation from
immediate personal concerns that we experience when we
enter the world of the artwork, or encounter natural beauty.
This feeling of freedom appears to be homologous with a state
of disinterestedness. That it is rarely considered by
aestheticians may be because of a suspicion that comes
perilously close to an other-worldly aestheticism typical of the
Decadents of the late 19th century. That fear is unjustified if
we recognize that disinterestedness operates only during the
actual duration of the aesthetic encounter, that it is, so to
speak, a device to enhance flexibility of interpretation and to
widen our sensibility, and that we may if we choose bring the
fruits of the engagement back into the orbit of our daily lives.
There is certainly no suggestion that the world of art is
superior to actuality, as the aesthetes proclaimed.[20]
7. Conclusion
Finally, some comment might be useful regarding how
disinterestedness relates to two of its associated concepts.
Disinterestedness is often linked to the notion of aesthetic
distance, as originally formulated by Bullough. There is,
however, no easy parallel between the two. First, Bullough's
dimension is chiefly used by him to distinguish different kinds
of art, while disinterestedness, as argued here, refers to the
act of interpretation by the appreciator. Then again, a work
which he would describe as over-distanced is one which is
excessively theoretical or abstract and which will thus fail to
make much impact. Conversely, one which is underdistanced
offers a clichéd presentation of the mundane and banal and
will again fail to impress. The former could be said to be
impersonal to an extreme degree, but it is not clear that the
latter can be described as "too personalized." And thirdly, as
Hanfling has pointed out, Bullough's dimension comprises
some five different kinds of distance, most of which have no
bearing on disinterestedness.[21]
The connection between disinterestedness and aesthetic
pleasure is by no means a simple one and has often given rise
to difficulties. Hutcheson, for example, distinguished two kinds
of pleasure arising from perceptions. One derives from the
external senses, such as the pleasure of eating, and the
second from the "internal sense", as with perceptions of
beauty, harmony and decency. One difference between them
was that only the former was associated with a prior
"uneasiness" due to appetite, while the latter is free of such
needs and is in that sense disinterested. Yet in the same
passage, he speaks of "the desire of beauty," which implies a
mental state preceding the perception, a wish to seek the
beautiful,[22] and neither Hutcheson nor anyone else has ever
wanted to deny that one could be passionate about art itself,
or that being disinterested was the same as being
dispositionally uninterested. We have then a preceding desire
for "beauty," which to a variable extent is fulfilled by the
pleasurable encounter with art. (Kant's approach to this issue
has already been mentioned.) Thus, if disinterest is to be
defended it must accommodate certain desires, such as the
wish for aesthetic gratification. But there is no reason why it
should not. Weak disinterest postulates no more than the
exclusion of uniquely personal references from the assessment
of an artwork. Subject to this proviso all manner of wishes and
fears have ready admittance.
As a more general reflection, it has repeatedly been suggested
here that an artwork displays elements of the world set out in
an arrangement which challenges our standard expectations
and that the role of disinterestedness is to facilitate our grasp
of what is being offered. Further, engagement with art is
generally regarded as intrinsically rewarding, which is to say
as having value. If these points are correct, it follows that a
primary value of art is that it affords opportunities to engage
in the task of reinterpretation and reintegration, to consider
that the world is not necessarily as we have always supposed.
We can then replace the long-standing question of "what is
the value of art" with "what is the function of art," to inquire
what it is that art does for us. The question leads on to
consideration of what we lack in our everyday experience that
drives us to seek the gratifications of art, a matter that raises
to some basic issues regarding the human situation. A
functional approach to aesthetics along these lines would have
many advantages, but that is a theme for another occasion.
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